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The below content previously appeared in the June 2024 issue of the Broward County Bar Association’s Barrister magazine.
Trial court erred by adopting a flat reduction of hours proposed by expert without making specific findings as to the reasonableness of the rates or the billing records.
Where insureds obtained a judgment in their favor and were entitled to recover attorneys’ fees, it was error for the trial court to accept the opposing expert’s suggestion that the court reduce the number of hours by a general number in order to account for “excessive time” without referencing the reasonableness of specific billing records. Without findings as to the number of hours or appropriateness of any reductions, the fee award was arbitrarily reduced and the result was not supported by competent, substantial evidence, warranting reversal. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Santos, 3D23-0940, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D871 (Fla. 3d DCA April 17, 2024).
Appellate court addresses the interplay between a proposal for settlement and an alternative recovery clause in a fee agreement.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, which was upheld on appeal. The circuit court, in its appellate capacity, also granted the motion for appellate attorney’s fees, and ordered the county court to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. On remand, the county court ultimately awarded a fraction of the trial-level attorney’s fees and completely denied the appellate fees, based on the fact that the attorneys were working under a flat-fee agreement. The appellate court reversed and remanded; regardless of the nature of the fee agreement between a party and its attorneys the court was required to award appellate attorney’s fees which were granted by appellate court. Moreover, the alternative fee provision in the fee agreement, which allowed attorneys to be awarded “the greater of” a specified fee or a court-awarded fee, was valid and enforceable. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Health Diagnostics of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., No. 3D20-2032, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D866, (Fla. 3d DCA April 17, 2024).
There is no jurisdictional time limit for scheduling the hearing on the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to a prevailing party after the timely filing of a motion seeing such fees and costs.
The trial court determined that the defendant was entitled to recover both trial and appellate attorneys’ fees and ordered the parties to schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of the award within 90 days. After the defendant waited over a year to set the hearing, the trial court concluded that the “unreasonable tardiness” had divested the court of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed, finding that the delay did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Importantly, however, the appellate court also expressly noted that it might be appropriate for the trial court to impose sanctions against the party for not adhering to reasonable deadlines, if the elements justifying such a sanction were present. HCA Health Serv. Of Fla., Inc. v. Berlin, 4D2022-2652, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D863 (Fla. 4th DCA April 17, 2024).
Trial court erred in awarding a contingency fee multiplier where there was no evidence that the relevant market required a multiplier to obtain competent counsel.
Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the defendant improperly placed a lien on his worker’s compensation settlement proceeds in an effort to recover for medical expenses related to the workplace injury. He prevailed on summary judgment. At the evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of damages and the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, the plaintiff argued, for the first time, that he was entitled to a contingency fee multiplier. The trial court applied a multiplier of 1.5 after determining that the relevant market required such a multiplier to incentivize effective counsel to undertake the representation. However, where the plaintiff had set forth no evidence on this point, the appellate court reversed because there was no “competent, substantial evidence” to support a multiplier. Foot & Ankle Center of Fla., LLC v. Vargas, 6D23-0665, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D887 (Fla. 6th DCA April 19, 2024).
Proposals for settlement are not required to contain language about how the judgment will be entered and when the payments will be made.
The trial court found the proposals for settlement in this auto collision case were ambiguous for their failure to “state that a judgment would be entered in the amounts offered,” and their failure to “provide a timeframe for payment.” The appellate court reversed, finding that neither the statute nor the rule requires that a proposal for settlement contain any such language. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Ortega v. All Dade Fences, Inc., 3D22-1483, 3D22-1852, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D516 (Fla. 3d DCA March 6, 2024).
Trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees and costs where proposals for settlement were ambiguous and required a separate confidential settlement agreement.
When a party serves a proposal for settlement, it must state with particularity any relevant conditions. If a release is proposed, a summary of it can be sufficient if it is sufficiently clear, eliminates any ambiguity about its scope, and allows the offeree to make an informed decision without needing clarification. Here, the proposal for settlement was conditioned upon the execution of a confidential settlement agreement and general release of all claims, but the terms of that separate agreement were never specified. No agreement was attached, there was no description or summary of its terms; therefore, the proposal was not sufficiently clear and definite to warrant the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs. Advantage Limousine, LLC v. Koutsos, 2D22-0257, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D507 (Fla. 2d DCA March 6, 2024).